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Currie and 1st Canadian Division
at Second Ypres, Aprill915
Controversy, Criticisn1
and Official History
Tim Travers
n 22 April1915, 1st Canadian Division was
stationed in the Ypres salient, when the first
gas attack of the war took place. To the left of the
Canadians was the French 45th Algerian Division,
which hastily retired in the face of the unexpected
chlorine gas. It was left, therefore, to 1st Canadian
Division to fill the gap and restore the situation,
which was basically achieved by 23 April.
However, severe German attacks over the next two
days, 24 and 25 April, tested 1st Canadian
Division to the limit. The critical problems of these
two days caused Brigadier-General Arthur Currie
(General Officer Commanding (GOC), 2nd
Brigade, in 1st Canadian Division) to order two
of his battalions to retire during the morning of
24 April, but the retirement did not take place.
Further difficulties at midday on 24 April caused
Currie to again issue retirement orders, and to
leave his headquarters and seek reinforcements
to fill a gap on his left. This entailed a visit by
Currie to the headquarters of the neighbouring
British 27th Division, commanded by MajorGeneral T.D'O. Snow. Currie did not rejoin his
2nd Brigade staff until some time that evening.
The next day, 25 April, strong German attacks
and some false information again caused Currie
in the afternoon to order two of his battalions to
withdraw. This action took place, to a depth of
some 1,000 yards, but subsequently the two
battalions returned to their original positions.
That night, 2nd Canadian Brigade was replaced
in the line by a brigade of the British 28th
Division. 1

O

After the war, in 1927, the Official British
Historian of the First World War, Brigadier

General Sir James Edmonds, told his friend,
military historian Captain B.H. Liddell Hart, of
this episode:
Currie three times ordered the Canadians to
retire, but his troops did not obey. Currie
reported his orders to Alderson (LieutenantGeneral E.A.H. Alderson, GOC 1st Canadian
Division) and on telling Snow, the latter said, "If
Currie was an English Officer I would have had
him put under arrest and he would probably
have been shot." ... When recorded in the (British)
Official History, vol. 3, Currie begged for its
deletion and this was granted. (It had hung over
his head for 13 years). 2

In fact, Currie did not beg for deletion of this
passage, although he did think that Edmonds was
"poisoned" against both himself and the staff of
2nd Canadian Brigade. Perhaps for this reason,
Currie drafted the reply that Colonel A. F. Duguid,
the Canadian Official Historian, sent to Edmonds,
defending Currie's actions. 3 Currie was not
blameless in issuing his three orders to parts of
his brigade to withdraw. For example, Colonel
Kirkaldie (Staff officer, 8th Battalion, later
Brigadier-General, commanding 12th Brigade of
4th Canadian Division) told General Sir David
Watson [commander 4th Canadian Division] that
he had saved 2nd Canadian Brigade at Second
Ypres, when "He had received orders from Currie
at midday [24 April] to retire, and with Lipsett
[Lieutenant-Colonel Lipsett, commanding 8th
Battalion of 2nd Canadian Brigade] was writing
out orders, and he stated that if Regiment had to
retire up face ofhill, they would be cleaned out.
They phoned to [Lieutenant-General Sir Herbert
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Plumer's VI Corps in line, and found that they
could hold out, and then asked that order should
be cancelled, which was granted. They could not
get Currie, having been told he was away trying
to get reinforcements. Later, order to retire was
again sent them, 8th Bn." Later, at 1400 hours
on 25 April, Currie personally handed over a
retirement order to Lieutenant-Colonel Tuxford,
commanding 5th Battalion in 2nd Brigade, but
although the battalion withdrew it then returned
and did not leave until after dark that day. Tuxford
also noted that his battalion had disobeyed orders
to retire the previous day. 4
It does seem that Currie was under
considerable pressure on 24 and 25 April, and
that he was probably hasty in issuing orders to
retire on those two days, but it must be
emphasized that, apart from tremendous German
pressure, the real culprit was actually Brigadier
General R.E.W. Turner, V.C., commanding 3rd
Brigade in 1st Canadian Division. In the late
morning of 24 April, at 1135 hours, Turner
ordered his battalions, plus two British
battalions, to fall back to the GHQ line, which
left a 3,000 yard gap to the left of 2nd Brigade.
He was ordered to close the gap, but did not
respond to 1st Canadian Division's orders, and
the situation was not restored until the next day,
partly by British troops and partly by Currie's
2nd Brigade. Turner's actions, which would have
been disastrous if the Germans had discovered
this gap, were covered up firstly by LieutenantGeneral Alderson, and then in the Canadian
Official History by Colonel Duguid. 5

Thus far it appears that Edmonds had
exaggerated Currie's actions, although there was
a core of truth to his accusations. However,
Edmonds' reference to Snow's comment about
Currie probably being shot if he had been an
English officer, was less reliable, as witnesses of
Currie's visit to Snow's 27th Division
headquarters on 24 April later showed. Currie
himself remarked that:
As soon as I [Currie] mentioned [to Snow] that

apparently there was a gap between the left of
my 8th Bn. and the 3rd Brigade troops, he
shouted at me and asked how dare I allow such
a gap to occur. To hear him you would think
that I personally and solely was responsible for
that gap ... He roundly abused me and told me to
get out, shouting at me to "give them hell, give

them hell." I asked ifl might send a message to
the 1st Division, but had no sooner sat down at
a table to write the message when I was told
that I was taking much too long over it. That
was an insult and so at variance to the treatment
which one officer should receive from another
of superior rank that I was almost
dumbfounded ... 6

Currie's version was supported by another
witness, a Major Lynn, of the Canadian Engineers.
Lynn remembered that when Currie asked Snow
for reinforcements, saying that "Your men are
fresh and their assistance would be of great value,"
Snow replied angrily: "Have you come here to
teach me my profession and dictate to me how I
shall handle my division?" Currie repeated his
request, and Snow responded unhelpfully: "Do
you expect me to wet nurse your Brigade? You
have got yourself and your men into a mess and
you will have to get them out as best you can."
Finally, Snow cut short the interview: "Enough of
this, I have heard enough of your harangue. Get
out of here. Take care of your own line, etc."
According to Edmonds, Currie had apparently
shown Snow a conditional withdrawal order to
the GHQ line for his 2nd Brigade, and Snow
certainly suspected that Currie wanted to take
his brigade out of the line, but at the least,
Edmonds' version of the interview seems skewed
against Currie. 7
At the same time that Edmonds was relating
the Currie story to Liddell Hart. he was also
arguing generally with the Canadian Official
Historian, Colonel A.F. Duguid, over the role of
1st Canadian Division at Second Ypres. Summing
up his disagreements with the Canadian version
of Second Ypres, Edmonds wrote a report to his
superiors, the branch of the Committee of
Imperial Defence that controlled the British
official histories of the First World War. Edmonds'
varied criticism of Currie forms a key part of this
report, but he also raised another general
problem, namely, the reliability of the Canadian
Official History due to the absence of certain war
diaries, and what he saw as the devious conduct
of Colonel Duguid. Because Edmonds' official
report to his superiors has never been published
in full before, it is worth reproducing in order to
show how suspicious Edmonds was of Currie and
Duguid, and of the way in which the Canadian
Official History was being prepared.

9

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1996

3

Canadian Military History, Vol. 5 [1996], Iss. 2, Art. 2

Text of J.E. Edmonds, "Canadian Comments on
'1915 (France)"' Vol. 1:, Committee of Imperial
Defence, Sub-Committee for the Control of the
Official Histories. Report of the Work of the
Historical Section by the Secretary.

The first TS. draft of this volume was circulated
in the usual way to all the principal surviving
officers who were concerned, down to the
battalion commanders. In the case of the Canadian
Division (which participated in the battle of
"Second Ypres") a copy was sent to Colonel A.F.
Duguid, the head of the Canadian Historical
Section for him to circulate (which he did not do,
merely sending the remarks of his Section). After
the receipt of all comments, the chapters were
revised, and re-typed and copies then sent to the
War Office and Foreign Office, some of the
principal officers concerned and again, at his
request, to Colonel Duguid.
In May 1926 - 15 months after 1914 Volume II
was published - the volume was ready to go to
press, except that the Canadian comments had
not been received. It had been approved by the
War Office and by all the British officers
concerned, including General Sir G. Milne (whom
Lord Plumer had deputed to act for him in the
matter) and Lieut.-General Sir E. Alderson, who
in the period concerned was commanding the
Canadian Division. He wrote that he considered
the narrative "excellent and fair." Of the three
other divisional commanders in "2nd Ypres,"
Lieut.-General Sir E. Bulfin (25th Division) wrote,
"I am full of admiration of your clear and
consecutive narrative of events."
Lieut.-General Sir T. Snow (27th Division) came
personally to offer his congratulations, and Lieut.General Sir. H. Keary (Meerut Division) wrote:
"I have carefully read through the draft of chapters
and have compared it carefully with the private
diary which I kept at the time. I do not find
anything recorded which I wish altered, nor have
I any reasonable comment to make."

The comments of subordinate officers were
equally satisfactory.
The drafts of the four chapters in which Canada
was concerned were sent to Colonel Duguid on
the 5th January, 22nd January, 11th February

and 17th February, 1926, respectively. No
comments were sent off by him from Ottawa until
16th July (received here 30th July), but in the
meantime private letters from a little group of
Canadians who are supporters of General Sir A.
Currie were received by various persons in
England, complaining that the narrative was not
impartial, etc. Among others who received a letter
from General Currie's particular friend, was Mr.
Amery, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.
He was good enough to reply:
"I have, as you suggested, read the three chapters
in the second draft. I cannot see anything on the
face ofthem that could be considered lacking in
fairness or appreciation or differing in tone
towards the Canadians from its tone towards
other units."

Another who received a letter was Major-General
Sir. P. Radcliffe, at one time the B.G.G.S. Canadian
Corps. I sent him the TS., and he wrote:
"I have read it very carefully, and I honestly do
not see anything to which exception can be taken
as regards Canadians at 'Second Ypres."'

Mr. C.T. Atkinson (Exeter College, Oxford), who
knows the records thoroughly, wrote:
"I don't think the Canadians have the least cause
for accusing this account of lacking in appreciation
or generosity."

I had, indeed, covered up a number of unpleasant
incidents, and particularly the unsoldierly
behaviour of General Currie and some of the higher
officers, appointed apparently by the late Sir Sam
Hughes for political services.x Their conduct, inter
alia had the result that their commands left the
front without waiting to be relieved by other
troops.
When the Canadian comments arrived, they were
found to be unimportant: small corrections of
detail and spelling, whilst obvious typing errors
were treated as errors of fact: they included also,
however, corrections of the account of the action
of British Imperial troops, of which the Canadian
Historical section had no first-hand information,
the changes being made in order to give more
credit to Canadian units. Instead of sending, as
requested, the remarks of the principal surviving
One ran away to Poperingh and reported he was rallying
his battalion there!

x

10

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol5/iss2/2

4

Travers: Currie and 1st Canadian Division at Second Ypres, April 1915: Con

Br.-Gen. Hayter (Brigade Major)
Four lines to the effect that "it is difficult to work
into an official narrative all the small incidents."
Br.-Gen. King (Battery Commander)
Explaining the curious retirement of his battery
across the Canal on the 22nd April.
Br.-Gen. Sir F. Loomis (Comdt. of St. Julien)
This officer had been removed from command of
his battalion and was put in charge of 2 1/2
companies of reserve. His comments are general
and abusive: "unfair, unfriendly and ungenerous
treatment."
Colonel McCuaig (Company Commander)
Attempt to minimize the services of a company
of the Buffs, which stiffened the Canadians.
Captain Ross (M.G. Officer)
Seven small useful detail comments. 20 lines in
all.
Colonel Anderson (not present)
General comments on the "unfairness" of the
draft.

Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds,
Official British Historian of the First World War

officers, all of course under the rank of divisional
commander in 1915, Colonel Duguid only sent
those of twelve officers, who only concerned
themselves with a few points:
General Sir A. Currie (Brigade Commander)
Principally abuse of General Snow, who did his
best to prevent him withdrawing his brigade
prematurely.
Lieut.-Gen. Turner (Brigade Commander)
Who denied sending a message from General
Snow's headquarters, and said he went there
through "simple curiosity, to see their wonderful
dug-outs."
Br.-Gen. Armstrong (C.R.E.)
Who complained that nothing had been said about
his supplying engineer stores to Imperial troops
as well as Canadians.
Lieut.-Col. Lamb (G.S.)
Noting his own services as liaison officer (131ines
only).
Lieut.-Col. Gordon Hall (G.S.)
Ten lines comment on the misuse of the divisional
reserve.

Colonel A.F. Duguid, Official Canadian
Historian of the First World War
(NAC PA 51570)
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Colonel Meighen (Battalion Commander)
General comment on the minimizing ofthe share
of Canadians.

None of these comments, except Captain Ross's,
was of the least use, and no explanation of why
the TS. was not circulated to the numerous other
surviving officers, not supporters of Sir A. Currie,
was offered.
Almost simultaneously with the arrival of the
cablegram notifying the despatch of the comments
from Ottawa, which arrived on the 30th July, I
was informed by the High Commissioner's Office
and the War Office that Colonel Duguid had left
Canada on a holiday visit to relatives in Scotland.
I got into communication with Duguid on his
arrival, and invited him to come to London offering
to pay expenses. He came at once arriving on
2nd August. I entertained him, and we spent the
next four days together. Far from being full of
Colonial bounce, he was evidently upset and
uneasy. I requested B.-General Aspinall to be
present at our first interview, and asked him
afterwards what he thought of Duguid's attitude.
He said, "it was like Ajax defying the lightning and not half liking the job."
We went one by one through all the comments,
Duguid getting more and more ashamed ofthem.
In the course of time I got the following out of
him. I had asked him five times in the previous
year to send me redrafts of any portion of the
narrative that he did not agree with: he says he
had direct orders of the C.G.S. NOT to do this,
but to find every possible fault with the draft. He
had checked the rank and initials of every officer
mentioned, the spelling of every name and place
name and the hour of every event; when accounts,
time, or even spelling of Belgian place names
varied, he had suggested the opposite to that one
which I had accepted. (This is evident in the
comments.) The object of all this smoke and dust
was to obscure the real issue which Colonel
Duguid said was to get expunged from the record
that on the 24th April Sir A. Currie and his staff
had made grave mistakes, and on the morning of
the 25th April, regardless of the troops alongside,
had ordered the retirement of his brigade, reported
his action in writing (the message is preserved)
to the Canadian Division and verbally to General
Snow (who used rather strong language to him).
The publication of the whole story of General

Currie's conduct would ruin his position in Canada
-where he is passing as a staunch supporter of
the Imperial connection. To my natural comment,
why didn't you write this to me and save all this
bother, he said that he had not been allowed to
do so in writing. Further, though admitting that
at the time too much credit had been given to the
Canadians and too little to the British (I have this
in writing), he begged for more praise for the
Canadians, and that the share in the battle of
General Snow might not be made so prominent,
(Generals Snow and Hull were singled out for
special praise by Sir J. French in his dispatch and
thoroughly deserved it).
On the advice of Mr. Amery and Mr. Churchill- to
whom I mentioned the difficulties -I added a little
more praise, although the British troops at 2nd
Ypres- particularly the 28th Division, which lost
three times as many men as the Canadian Division
- were disgusted at the praise lavished by the
press on the Canadians, and omitted the incident
of General Currie's orders and his other dubious
conduct at Ypres, though it had an effect on the
position of troops which it is a little difficult to
hide; and in general I accepted Colonel Duguid's
proposed corrections where they did not affect
Imperial troops, in particular that the Canadian
retirements had been made in good order, and
that the slow German advance was due to the
Canadian defence, not, as the Germans say, to
their troops being of a poor class and unwilling,
after months of trench warfare, to push on. He
expressed himself fully satisfied, and wrote me
the following letter in leaving:
"S.S. Montcalm, 13th August 1926
Dear General Edmonds,
From the above you will see that I leave for
Canada according to plan, so this is just a line to
thank you for your kindness and consideration in
what would otherwise have been a nasty mess.
With kind regards, I remain,
Yours sincerely,

A. Fortescue Duguid"

When I asked him to let me have a note of his
expenses, he said that his trip to England was
paid for officially, and he admitted that the story
of his being on a holiday was a pretense. I also
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"I am not surprised that you found the account
and maps inaccurate. It was written soon after
by one of my Canadian staff. I did not want to
hu,rt his feelings. I sent it in muc)1 as he wrote it.
They were very sensitive, and I often had to do
that."

I consulted Field-Marshal Lord Haig on the matter,
and he said, "the Canadians never were where
they said they were," and that at Festubert he
had to send an aeroplane to look for them.
It should also be placed on record that Duguid
tried to impose on me as historical material a
typewritten dossier entitled "Extracts from
messages, reports, etc. Second Battle ofYpres."
This purported to be a file of the messages and
reports arranged in order of narrative time. On
checking them I found that hours, even days in
some cases, did not correspond with such originals
as I had, and that extracts of some sort of narrative
had been interpolated as contemporaneous
reports. Colonel Duguid could not say how it was
that this had happened.

Lieutenent-General Sir E.A.H. Alderson, General
Ojjlcer Commanding 1st Canadian Division.
(NAC PA 168103)

asked Colonel Duguid why in the eight years since
peace, with a large historical section, Canada had
not produced a history of the troops in the war,
as Australia and New Zealand had done. He replied
that the Canadians dare not write until the British
account had appeared, for fear of their version
not being believed: their plan was to force their
narrative on us. Sir Max Aitken's (Lord
Beaverbrook) "Canada in Flanders" he said was
worthless - as a matter of fact it contains
statements which upset some of the present
Canadian claims that they never gave ground.
To complete the unpleasant story, it should be
added that it was somewhat difficult in the first
place to compile the account of 2nd Ypres, as
the Canadian war diaries of the period for the
Division and the 2nd and 3rd Infantry Brigades
(commanded by Generals Currie and Turner) have
disappeared, and typewritten narratives have been
substituted for them. These narratives
unfortunately do not fit in with the war diaries
that are available. When I asked Lieut.-General
Sir E. Alderson what value could be placed on
the divisional narrative, he wrote:

I have further to report the following incident: In
1924, when Colonel Duguid was in England to
collect material for the Canadian Official History,
we agreed verbally that before the British Historical
Section published any volumes in which Canadian
forces were engaged, the draft should be sent to
Canada for comment, and he volunteered the
promise that the Canadian Official History should
be submitted to me. This he subsequently
repeated in writing. But he has got round the
promise by publishing in the Encyclopedia
Britannica Supplement Volume Ill, just issued, an
entirely misleading account of "Second Ypres." It
is signed with initials" A.F.D." explained in list of
contributors as" A. Fortescue Duguid" .x In this he
devotes nearly the whole space to the Canadian
Division, only mentions six battalions of the five
(and part of a sixth) British divisions engaged,
and entirely omits the Canadian retirement on the
24th and 25th April 1915 by which a large piece
of the Salient was lost. Naturally he does not
mention the counter-attack ofthe British Yorkshire
Territorials, which drove the Germans out of St.
Julien after the Canadians had lost it.
(signed) J.E. Edmonds 1.XII.268
It seems certain that he did not expect that his name
would be divulged.

x
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t is of interest here to get Duguid's side of the
story of his visit to Britain. Duguid told the
Canadian Chief of Staff that he arrived in Scotland
for his holiday, and then received the anticipated
invitation from Edmonds for an interview in
London. Duguid argued that as a result of his
discussions with Edmonds, liaison between the
two sections was properly established, that errors
had been replaced by facts, that the anti-Canadian
atmosphere at Edmonds' office had been
dispelled, and that Edmonds had promised a
third draft for Canadian perusal. 9 Nevertheless,
it does appear that Duguid was on the defensive,
that he did conceal some evidence from Edmonds,
and that there probably had once been a 1st
Canadian Division war diary which was replaced
by a later narrative of events. For example, Colonel
J. Sutherland Brown, DAQMG of 1st Canadian
Division, told J.H. MacBrien, the Canadian Chief
of Staff, in 1925, that "The report of the battle
[Second Ypres] was available but I was informed
by Col. Lamb [Staff Officer, 1st Canadian Division]
that the correspondence [between Alderson, GOC
1st Canadian division, and Turner] had been
destroyed ... and it is probable that the War Diaries
compiled at Divisional HQs, together with some
correspondence connected with the retirement of
the Third Brigade, were burnt at the same time ... "
Colonel Cecil Romer, a British staff officer with
1st Canadian Division, stated that someone in
"G" branch of 1st Canadian Division kept the
usual war diary, but "Why and when the latter
vanished I have no idea." Finally, BrigadierGeneral E. de B. Panet, also 1st Canadian Division
Staff, simply noted that there was a war diary,
but he did not keep copies, and thought it rather
extraordinary that they were missing. Duguid
forwarded "Extracts" ofthis debate to Edmonds
in January 1926, but omitted the Sutherland
Brown, Romer and Panet information! 10

I

Edmonds' other chief target in his report, the
allegations against Currie, have been addressed
above, but one item in Edmonds' report is still
an open question. Why did Duguid and his
Canadian official history staff only produce one
volume of narrative for the years 1914 to 1915
(plus a documents volume and a medical volume)
of the Canadian Official History of the First World
War? Why did this volume take until 1938 to
appear? And what happened to the other volumes
for 1916, 1917, and 1918? Edmonds' answer is
contained in his report, namely, that the Canadian

strategy was to wait for the British volumes to be
drafted, and then press their own version onto
the British volumes, before presumably getting
on with their own volumes. One letter from
Duguid seems to support this position, where
Duguid argues that efforts to make the British
History accurate had seriously interfered with the
Canadian Official History, and this seems to be
the case, for already in 1924 Duguid had laid out
a projected eight volumes. But under public
pressure in the late 1930s, Duguid explained that
the Historical Section was reorganized in 1921,
and then for 11 years simply collated a large
quantity of documents and answered queries,
especially from the British Historical section.
Then in May 1932, Duguid started writing the
Canadian History. This still seems a very slow
rate of progress, but it was not because of staff
shortages, because Duguid also argued that
adding to the staff would not help, although the
present staff should be placed on a permanent
basis. However, in the end Duguid basically
argued that the other Canadian volumes were not
written because the Historical Staff had so many
other duties to perform, presumably answering
queries, no doubt largely from Edmonds and his
staffY
This story really reveals that the history of
the Canadians in the First World War is composed
of two aspects- the events themselves- and then
how the events were agreed upon and published
by the official historians of both Britain and
Canada. There is also the evident and rather
surprising bias ofEdmonds against the Canadian
forces (and subsequently other Dominions) as he
reported to his superiors and wrote his version
of the First World War. And finally, these
controversies and criticisms relate to 1st
Canadian Division in its.first major battle of the
war, before, according to Robert Graves, it became
one of the "recognized top-notch divisions" of the
entire British Expeditionary Force. 12
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